Blowing the Lid Off: Expanding the Due Process Clause to Defend the Defenseless against Hurricane Katrina by Duhart, Olympia
Nova Southeastern University 
NSUWorks 
Faculty Scholarship Shepard Broad College of Law 
2007 
Blowing the Lid Off: Expanding the Due Process Clause to Defend 
the Defenseless against Hurricane Katrina 
Olympia Duhart 
Nova Southeastern University - Shepard Broad Law Center, duharto@nsu.law.nova.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles 
NSUWorks Citation 
Olympia Duhart, Blowing the Lid Off: Expanding the Due Process Clause to Defend the Defenseless 
against Hurricane Katrina (2007), 
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles/308 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Shepard Broad College of Law at NSUWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more 
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu. 
BLOWING THE LID OFF: EXPANDING THE




I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 411
II. 42 U .S.C. § 1983 ........................................ 417
A . H istory .............................................. 417
B. Possible Defendants ................................. 418
C. Equitable Relief ..................................... 420
1II. A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM ................... 421
A. DeShaney v. Department of Winnebago Service ..... 423
B. State-Created Danger Exception ..................... 425
C. Special Relationship Exception ...................... 430
IV . CONCLUSION ............................................ 435
Five frogs are sitting on a log. Four decide to jump off
How many are left?
Answer: five.
Why? Because there's a difference between deciding and doing.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Long before the storm made landfall in Louisiana on August 29,
2005,2 Hurricane Katrina was already set to become the most horrific
natural disaster in United States history. The hurricane-which oblit-
erated an area covering almost 90,000 square miles along the Gulf
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1. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, at
v (Comm. Print 2006) available at http://www.katrina.house.gov/full-katrina-report.
htm [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE] (quoting Mark L. Feldman & Michael F.
Spratt, Five Frogs on a Log). It is more than appropriate that the House Report on
the Hurricane Katrina Preparation and Response begins with a string of aphorisms
concerning lack of initiative, blame, and responsibility. As discussed throughout this
paper, the government's inadequate response to the impending Katrina hurricane re-
flects a systemic failure that impaired already vulnerable classes and compounded the
effects of the storm.
2. Elisabeth Bumiller, In New Orleans, Bush Speaks With Optimism But Sees Lit-
tle of Ruin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A12. 411
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Coast 3-ultimately impacted 1.5 million people4 and handily earned
the title of the costliest natural disaster in United States history,5 with
insurable losses in excess of $100 billion.6 More than 1,500 deaths
have been attributed to the hurricane.7 The powerful storm8 left its
mark on people throughout the Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana
regions.9 New Orleans took the brunt of the storm's violence.10 Ka-
trina ripped through the region, and in its wake left an already-dilapi-
3. S. REP. No. 109-322, at 2 (2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/
katrina/fullreport.pdf. The storm impacted an area roughly the size of the United
Kingdom. Id.
4. FEMA's Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste Before the
Comm. On S. Homeland Sec. and Gov'tal Affairs, 109th Congress (2006) (statement
of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec.) [hereinafter
FEMA's MANUFACTURED HOUSING]. The hardest hit areas lost all infrastructure
such as electricity, water, sewer, roads, and communication systems. Howard Witt,
New Orleans Ravaged; 80 Percent of City Submerged After Levees Burst, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 31, 2005, at C1. The flooding following the passage of Katrina was "catastrophic,
resulting in the displacement of 250,000 people, a higher number than during the Dust
Bowl years of the 1930's." AXEL GRAUMANN ET AL., HURRICANE KATRINA, A CLI-
MATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-
report-200501z.pdf.
5. Kim Lanier, Hurricane Scale Is Called Misleading; Some Say Size, Surge
Should Be Factored In, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 7, 2006, at 9.
6. Carolyn A. Dehring, The Value of Building Codes, 29 REG. 10 (2006). Hurri-
cane Katrina caused at least $125 billion in economic damage and could cost the in-
surance industry up to $60 billion in claims. Katrina Damage Estimate Hits $125B,
USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/
2005-09-09-katrina-damage-x.htm. By comparison, Hurricane Andrew in 1992
caused nearly $21 billion in insured losses in today's dollars. Id.
7. Another Katrina Victim Found, in Eastern N.O.: Woman Was in House, Buried
Under Debris, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 22, 2006, at 3; Deaths of Out-of-
State Evacuees Raise Katrina Toll, WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at A2. The death toll
includes deaths that are related to the storm or its aftermath. Evacuee Deaths In-
crease Katrina's Louisiana Toll, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 20, 2006, A14. More than
1,000 people perished in Louisiana alone. Reports of Missing and Deceased (Aug. 2,
2006), http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248. As of
August 1, 2006, 135 people remained on the official missing list from Hurricanes Ka-
trina and Rita in Louisiana. Id.
8. Hurricane Katrina was a Category 3 hurricane when it made landfall in Louisi-
ana. GRAUMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2; Bumiller, supra note 2. Howard Witt,
The Parish the Feds Left Behind, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 2006, at C1. Just after 6 a.m.
August 29, 2006, Katrina made landfall near Plaquemines Parish, which is just south
of Buras, as a strong Category 3 storm. GRAUMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2. Wind
speeds at landfall were approximately 127 miles per hour. Id. Katrina was extraordi-
narily powerful and was one of the deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United
States. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT-HURRICANE KA-
TRINA 1 (2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. After it
made initial landfall in Louisiana near Buras, it continued northward and made its
final landfall near the mouth of the Pearl River at the Louisiana/Mississippi border,
still as a Category 3 hurricane. Id. at 3.
9. FEMA's Manufactured Housing Program, supra note 4.
10. More than 1,000 people perished in Louisiana alone. FEMA's Manufactured
Housing Program, supra note 4. Al
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dated levee system vulnerable to attacks from the wind and the rain.11
Once the Pontchartrain levee system notoriously breached, 80 percent
of New Orleans was flooded.' 2 Some areas were more than twenty
feet underwater.1
3
But the real tragedy surrounding Hurricane Katrina had started
days before the storm made landfall. Before the levees broke and
long before the first winds arrived on shore, the residents of New Or-
leans had been stranded by their government officials. On the eve-
ning of August 27, 2005-less than 48 hours before the landfall-
National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield made a personal
telephone call to Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and later
talked to New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin in an effort to emphasize the
severity of the storm and express concern for the safety of the re-
sidents in its track.' 4 The call was practically unprecedented. 5 Left
alone, the mayor of the city in the midst of a soup-bowl16 had not
taken the essential step to convince residents to seek shelter else-
11. Iris Young, Katrina: Too Much Blame, Not Enough Responsibility, DISSENT,
Winter 2006, 41, 43. "Since Katrina we have learned that the levees in New Orleans
were poorly maintained for decades, and that a number of experts predicted several
years ago that they were liable to breach with a bad hurricane." Id.
12. Peter Whoriskey & Sam Coates, Looting, Fires and a Second Evacuation,
WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2005, at Al; Witt, supra note 4. According to the 6,000-page
report issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, the losses emanating from the levy
failures are much more than physical: "'The flooding caused a breakdown in New
Orleans' social structure, a loss of cultural heritage and dramatically altered the physi-
cal, economic, political, social and psychological character of the area," it said. "These
impacts are unprecedented in their social consequence and unparalleled in the mod-
ern era of the United States."' Ralph Vartabedian, Army Corps Admits Design Flaws
in New Orleans Levees, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at Al.
13. See NOAA's Nat'l Climatic Data Ctr., News Highlights, Fall 2005, at 1, availa-
ble at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/about/NOAA Newsletter4.pdf.
14. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 108; DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE
GREAT DELUGE, 57 (2006). Mayfield said that he "wanted to do 'everything that I
could do' to warn the country that the Gulf Coast-and New Orleans in particular-
was in grave danger." Id. Mayfield telephoned Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco
to reiterate the danger of the storm and explain his efforts to track down Mayor
Nagin. Id. Governor Blanco agreed to call the mayor and put them in touch. Id.;
Mark Schleifstein, Hurricane Center Director Warns New Orleans: This Is Really
Scary, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 27, 2005, http://www.nola.com/katrina/updates/.
15. S. REP. No. 109-322, at 5. In more than three decades as director of the Na-
tional Hurricane Center, Mayfield had only personally called the state officials once
before to make a personal plea. Id. See also A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1,
at 125 n.34.
16. Throughout the storm's approach, several media outlets reported that the city
was a "bowl" and could be left submerged by the storm. S. REP. No. 109-322, at 5. As
homeland security coordinator for Jefferson parish explained, New Orleans' unique
geographic characteristics expose it to special threat of flooding. NOW with Bill
Mayers, Transcript of The City in a Bowl, Sept. 20, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/now/
transcript/transcript-neworleans.html. The city faces inherent vulnerability to flood-
ing by virtue of its location on subsiding swampland on the delta of the Mississippi.
See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 51. The city's average elevation is six
feet below sea level. Id. "The greatest threat from hurricanes is not wind, but storm-
surge, which accounts for most of the damage and deaths caused by hurricanes." Id.
413
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where; he had not yet issued a mandatory evacuation.17 Once the
mandatory evacuation order was finally issued, the storm was ex-
pected to make landfall in only 15 hours.' 8 Even worse, the eleventh-
hour mandatory order was not accompanied by transportation needed
to carry it out, despite the fact that two in ten households in the New
Orleans disaster area had no working car. 9
Such an oversight was only one of many examples of neglect that
plagued the region in the days preceding the storm. According to
some estimates, thousands of people would have been spared the
worst of the storm's force if the local authorities had made provisions
to help move those in the storm's path to safety.2° Along with the
debilitating power of nature, the victims of Katrina had to suffer
through expansive systemic failures. The hurricane blew the lid off
17. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 58-9. "Throughout all nine of Louisiana's coastal
parishes, only a mandatory evacuation drew the attention of storm-tested residents-
anything less was inadequate." Id. at 5. In Mayor Nagin's defense, a mandatory evac-
uation order had never been issued in the history of New Orleans-287 years. Id.
There are three levels of evacuation: voluntary, recommended, and mandatory. Id. at
20. "Only the [mandatory evacuation] carries real weight-and places the responsi-
bility for evacuation on state and local government officials." Id.
18. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 626. Neither Louisiana Governor Blanco nor
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation until Sunday morn-
ing. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 109. The mandatory evacuation or-
der was issued at 11:00 a.m. Sunday, August 29, 2006. See id. The hurricane was due
to come ashore in approximately 19 hours. Id. The storm actually made landfall near
Buras, Louisiana at 6:10 a.m. Monday, August 29, 2006, about 20 hours after the
mandatory order was issued. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 628. As the House Com-
mittee pointed out, the late evacuation order is particularly troubling because state
and local officials received adequate warnings regarding the severity of the hurricane
56 hours before landfall. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 2. Addition-
ally, the consequences of a hurricane striking the New Orleans region were well
known before the threat of Katrina. Id.
19. Katrina's Victims Poorer than U.S. Average, FoxNEws.coM, Sept. 05, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168500,00.html (hereinafter "Victims Poorer").
At the time the storm approached, more than 112,000 adult New Orleanians did not
own cars. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 24; Gordon Russell, Nagin Orders First-Ever
Mandatory Evacuation of New Orleans, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 28,
2005, at Al.
20. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 111. The failure to implement
meaningful evacuation procedures, namely, a timely mandatory order and the trans-
portation needed to get citizens to safety led to incomplete evacuation and increased
the threat of the storm. See id.
[The decision] did not reflect the publicly stated recognition that Hurricane
Katrina would "most likely topple [the] levee system" and result in "intense
flooding" and "waters as high as 15 or 20 feet," rendering large portions of
the city uninhabitable. As a result, more than 70,000 people remained in the
city to be rescued after the storm. Id.
In contrast to the laissez-faire attitude about the impending storm that seemed to
characterize New Orleans officials, the president of the Plaquemines Parish (another
one of the nine coastal parishes) declared a mandatory "Phase I" evacuation on Au-
gust 27, "that Saturday when there was still plenty of time to flee-parish employees
fanned out on preappointed routes, picking up residents with special needs and busing
them to state-run shelters in Shreevport, Alexandria, Houma, and Lafayette." BRINK-
LEY, supra note 14, at 5. ,,
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festering poverty, infrastructure failures, and government inadequa-
cies. And as usual, the most vulnerable classes of people were hit
hardest. Seventy percent of those who died in Hurricane Katrina
were 61 years of age or older.2 ' The dead from nursing homes ac-
count for about ten percent of Louisiana deaths from the storm.22
People living in the path of Katrina's worst devastation were twice as
likely as most Americans to be poor and without a car. 3 In addition,
one-fourth of those in the hardest hit areas lived below the poverty
level.2 4 Seventeen percent of the residents lived in what is called "ex-
treme poverty," in which a family of four is making approximately
$9,000 a year.2 5 Twelve percent of the victims of Hurricane Katrina
were members of single-mother households26 ; thirty-eight percent of
the children in New Orleans were living in households with incomes
below the federal poverty threshold.27 Despite the startling obstacles
facing the residents, they were charged with self-help as the storm ap-
proached. Officials failed to complete evacuations to move people to
safer, higher ground. 28 The maintenance of the levees that flooded
after the storm fell through the cracks of bureaucratic red tape.
29
21. Eric Lipton, Committee Focuses on Failure to Aid New Orlean's Infirm, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A20.
22. Roma Khanna, Katrina's Aftermath, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 27, 2005, at Al.
Most of the dead did not lose their lives because of floodwater or immediate storm
damage; instead, interviews revealed that most of the nursing home deaths occurred
after days in brutal conditions. Id. "Their deaths and the effects on survivors re-
present the worst medical catastrophe for the elderly in recent U.S. history." Id.
23. Victims Poorer, supra note 19. An Associated Press analysis of Census data
showed that two in ten households in the disaster area had no car, compared with one
in ten nationwide. Id.
24. Id.
25. NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, CHILD POVERTY IN STATES HIT BY
HURRICANE KATRINA, available at http://www.nccp.org/pub-cpt05a.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2007). "New Orleans and the surrounding region have long been home to
some of the poorest children in the country." Id. at 1.
26. Victims Poorer, supra note 19, at 1. This figure is almost twice the national
average, in which seven percent of children live in single-mother households. Id. A
child reared by a single mother faces special adversities and difficulties.
27. NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, supra note 25, at 1. The federal pov-
erty level is $16,090 a year for a family of three and $19,350 a year for a family of four.
Id.
28. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 2 ("The failure of complete
evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief.").
29. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 194. "Over the years, improvements were made,
patches introduced, and the need for repairs noted and sometimes neglected." Id. A
few months before Hurricane Katrina, a $427,000 repair to a "crucial floodgate lan-
guished in excusable bureaucratic delay ... " Id. At the same time, the Orleans
Levee District Board directed its attention to building parks, overseeing docks, and
investing in on-water gambling. Id. See also Ann Carrns, Holes in the Dike: Long
Before Flood, New Orleans System Was Prime for Leaks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2005,
at Al. The levees that failed under the weight of Katrina were built by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("USACE"), and were a joint federal, state, and
local effort with shared cost. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 89. Differ-
ent parts of the Lake Pontchartrain project were turned over to four different local
415
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Hurricane Katrina's crippling impact on the poor; elderly, and infirm
highlights the need to reconsider the government's responsibility to
help those who are unable to help themselves.
This paper advocates an expanded reading of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include affirmative obliga-
tions to act. Specifically, this paper considers the government's failure
to act during the threat of Hurricane Katrina a valid cause of action
under a Section 1983 Civil Rights suit. State officials, local officials,
and local government must be held accountable for their monumental
failures during the storm. The government's mistreatment of its most
vulnerable citizens-the poor, the elderly, and the sick-may consti-
tute a due process violation3° under one of the exceptions to the no-
duty rule generally imposed on the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.3 ' A "more perfect Union '"32 must act on its du-
ties-both negative and affirmative-to protect the powerless against
harm.
Part II of this paper will provide a brief introduction to Section 1983
litigation, examining possible defendants and the type of relief availa-
ble. Part III will discuss Fourteenth Amendment violations supported
by two exceptions to the no-duty rule under DeShaney33 : the state-
sponsors. Id. at 91. "[S]eparate water and sewer districts are responsible for main-
taining pumping stations." Id. According to the investigation conducted by the
USACE, known officially as the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, the
corps had lost some of its expertise in building stronger levees in the 1980s, and
shifted emphasis to managing projects. Vartabedian, supra note 12. The report also
concluded that flooding in New Orleans would have occurred, but reduced substan-
tially, had the levees not failed. Id. A computer simulation showed that if the levees
had not failed, the flooding would have been about one-third of what occurred. Id.
30. Residents of Mississippi and Alabama, as well as Floridians who braced the
storm in its Category 1 incarnation on August 25, 2006, all felt the effects of Hurricane
Katrina. See FEMA'S MANUFACIURED HoUsING, supra note 4, at 1. However, this
paper is limited to a discussion of government responsibility to the residents of New
Orleans, Louisiana. The limit is prompted by the storm's catastrophic effects on the
state and the preventable losses caused in large part by systemic human failures. See
supra text accompanying notes 2, 7.
31. While the no-duty rule generally applies, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized two exceptions. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 195-202 (1989). The first is the state-created danger exception, in which
the government is responsible for creating the danger; the second is the special rela-
tionship exception, in which the potential plaintiff is in government custody and the
person is unable to protect himself or herself. See id.
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl. The preamble of the United States Constitution reads, in
full:
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union,
establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
Id.
33. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. This case is considered the leading case on the
prohibition against affirmative duties in the Constitution. It will be discussed in
greater detail in Section III of this paper. See infra Part III.B. Al,
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created 34 danger rule and the special relationship exception. This part
of the paper will also examine the government's failures leading up to
the Katrina debacle in light of the two exceptions, arguing that either
could be used to make the state and local officials liable under a due
process claim. Finally, this paper will conclude with a look ahead at
government's response to the constant threat of hurricanes and
whether anything has been learned from the events surrounding Hur-
ricane Katrina.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A. History
Commonly known as the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the
primary vehicle for obtaining damages and equitable relief against
state and local officials who violate the Constitution or federal law.
35
The legislation was passed in 1871 as part of the Reconstruction Era
Civil Rights Legislation aimed at protecting the rights of new black
Americans.36 The act reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory re-
lief was unavailable.
37
Although passed shortly after Reconstruction, Section 1983 lay dor-
mant for decades until the United States Supreme Court resuscitated
34. For the purposes of this paper, the term "state" is not limited to state officers,
but to government entities including the state, cities, and local subdivisions.
35. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 42 (2000). "Section 1983 is only a vehicle for substantive claims that
have their base elsewhere. It is not an independent source of constitutional or statu-
tory rights." SHELDON NAHMOD, ED., A SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY
47, quoting Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights - Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985).
36. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The act was originally enacted after
the American Civil War, and came into the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
April 20, 1871 with an intent to provide a remedy for abuses being committed in
southern states, especially by the Ku Klux Klan. See id. at 276. The goal of the legis-
lation was to "address the deprivations of civil rights and civil liberties in the post-
Civil War South" and "give the victims a federal cause of action in federal court."
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS ET AL., 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 739 (2003).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). A l
20071
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it through Monroe v. Pape.38 The use of Section 1983 in Monroe
ushered in a new era of civil rights litigation,39 which has since bur-
geoned.4 ° Even with the surge in civil rights cases recently, this breed
of constitutional tort litigation is not without limits.
B. Possible Defendants
One such limit on Section 1983 litigation is the list of possible de-
fendants who can be sued for civil rights violations. Courts have de-
fined who and what constitutes a "person" subject to suit under
Section 1983. First, Section 1983 does not create a valid cause of ac-
tion against the federal government or federal officials.41 The plain
language of the statute limits it to a "person" acting under color of
state law.42 Also, courts have been unwilling to expand the legislation
to puncture the sphere of sovereign immunity enjoyed by the federal
government.43 Thus, the federal government and federal officials are
not "persons" for purposes of Section 1983 litigation.
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that the doctrine of respon-
deat superior does not apply to municipal liability for actions). In Monroe, the plain-
tiffs claimed that 13 Chicago police officers who broke into their home in the early
morning, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living room and later
took them to the police station on "open" charges without first going before a magis-
trate constituted a violation of their Constitutional rights. Monroe, 365 U.S. at
169-70. The plaintiff, Mr. Monroe, was arrested and detained without a warrant and
without arraignment, which Mr. Monroe alleged violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 170. The city of Chicago moved to dismiss, but the Supreme Court held
that Section 1983 provides a federal remedy when state officials fail to enforce state
laws "by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise" and thereby
deprive citizens of their rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 180.
39. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 37. Monroe is particularly significant be-
cause it "overturn[ed] a longstanding assumption that § 1983 reached only misconduct
either officially authorized or so widely tolerated as to amount to a 'custom or us-
age."' Id. It effectively expanded the concept of "state action." See id.
40. Id. at 42. A "crude" measure of the impact of Monroe v. Pape is measurable
through the activity in federal courts. Id. "In the year of the Monroe decision, fewer
than 300 suits were brought in federal court under all the civil rights acts." Id. Within
ten years, that figure had grown to 8,267. Id. In 1998, more than 43,000 suits were
brought under the civil rights acts, primarily section 1983. Id.
41. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 78. There are judicially created damage
actions that run against federal officers who violate constitutional rights. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In
Bivens, the plaintiff claimed that federal narcotics agents entered his home and ar-
rested him in front of his family, threatened his family with arrest, searched the apart-
ment and was later subjected to a visual strip search. Id. at 389. The Court concluded
that the allegations stated a cause of action, and that when federal rights are violated,
federal courts have the power to supply a remedy. Id. at 395, 397. A Bivens action is
directly analogous to the cause of action available against state and local officials
under section 1983. Id. at 395.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
43. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 78. Despite the existence of Bivens
actions, there are some respects in which federal officers are treated specially. Id. For
example, the President has absolute immunity from award damages for official mis-
conduct. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982). In addition, there is broa 18
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States are also not "persons" for purposes of Section 1983 litiga-
tion.44 The state also enjoys sovereign immunity for purposes of Sec-
tion 1983 litigation.4" The Eleventh Amendment makes clear the
shield erected against litigants who would attempt to sue the state:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of
Subject of any Foreign State."46
Notwithstanding the inability to sue the state under Section 1983, a
cause of action for civil rights violations may be maintained against
the state by way of the Ex Parte Young fiction.47 Under Ex Parte
Young, relief can be obtained that will effectively run against the
state.4" The prohibition against suing a state is not disturbed when a
state official is sued in his or her official capacity for prospective in-
junctive relief.4 9
A Section 1983 suit may be maintained against a municipality or
political subdivision.5" Courts have consistently held that a municipal
corporation is a "person" for purposes of Section 1983 litigation with
regard to declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.51 Furthermore,
immunity for federal legislators and their aids for any official acts. See Eastland v. U.
S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503, 510 (1975).
44. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
45. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 43-44. "[Tihe Eleventh Amendment "(or
the principle of state sovereign immunity it is said to reflect) generally bars the award
of money damages against states and state agencies ... " Id. at 19.
46. US CONST. amend. XI. Though not as clear from the language of the text, the
United States Supreme Court has adopted the position that the Eleventh Amendment
reflects a wide-sweeping sovereign immunity shield that "protects states from virtu-
ally all suits in federal court." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 192 (2006). The Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment
bars suits against state government by citizens of another state, citizens of a foreign
country and Indian tribes. Id. at 194. The Court has also held that citizens are also
prohibited from suing their own state in federal court. Id. at 194; see also Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
47. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (enjoining the Attorney General of
Minnesota to conform his future conduct of that office to the requirements laid down
in the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See id.
49. See JEFFRIES ET AL, supra note 35, at 11. "The official is 'stripped' of any
,official or representative character' if the enforcement of state law violates the fed-
eral Constitution, even though the official's conduct is still regarded as 'state action'
under the Fourteenth Amendment (without which there would be no constitutional
violation)." Id. The Supreme Curt also held that a successful plaintiff who obtains
prospective injunctive relief from a state officer will also be entitled to an award of
attorneys fees payable from the state treasury. MARY MASSARON Ross, ED., SWORD
& SHIELD REVISITED, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 21 (1998).
50. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
51. See id. at 690. "Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local
government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Id.
As noted earlier, however, the Monell court rejected the strict application of the re-
spondeat superior doctrine to municipal liability. Id. at 691, 695. A section 1983 act %9
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the local subdivisions in New Orleans, parishes, have also been sued
under Section 1983.52 Finally, local officials can be sued as a "person"
for Section 1983 litigation.
53
C. Equitable Relief
While Section 1983 opens the door for damages to assist plaintiffs,
the plain language of the law also provides the remedy of equitable
relief.54 As discussed earlier, equitable relief may be obtained against
state officials (which essentially runs against the state itself) through
the Ex Parte Young caselaw.55 Most importantly, the prospective in-
junctive relief can still be upheld even when the expenditure of state
funds is required.56
may be maintained only when municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional dep-
rivation. Id. at 694.
52. See, e.g., Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing a section
1983 case to proceed against the Lafayette Parish Police Jury in Louisiana for an al-
leged Fourth Amendment violation as incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
53. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (holding that individual employees of
state government may be sued); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808
(1985) (holding that individual employees of city government may be sued in their
individual capacities). While the pursuit of damages against local governing bodies
and local officials is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that possible
obstacles are present for the litigant pursuing damages against either. First, the de-
fense custom and policy may be present for a municipality against whom damages is
sought. See generally Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The custom and policy limits recovery
from a municipality to acts that are the result of a policy statement or regulation
promulgated by the entity's officers, or the result of the entity's custom. See id. at
690-94. Additionally, the defense of qualified immunity may also be available for
local officials being sued for damages. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Under the qualified immunity defense, a
successful plaintiff seeking damages from a local government official performing dis-
cretionary activities must show that the defendant violated statutory or constitutional
rights that were clearly established at the time of the complained of incident. Harlow,
457 U.S. at 818. The qualified immunity defense may be raised if the conduct violated
clearly established rights "of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. Ab-
solute immunity is also an available defense in some instances for state and local
legislators, judges and prosecutors when civil damages are sought. See generally Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (upholding immunity for judges); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976) (upholding immunity for state prosecuting attorney. For a more
detailed discussion of qualified and absolute immunity defenses in the section 1983
arena, see Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187
(1993); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L.J. 87 (1999).
54. Section 1983 states that a plaintiff may be "...liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (emphasis added). The pursuit of equitable relief also alters the analysis for
purposes of immunity. Ross, supra note 49, at 512. "There is a distinction from im-
munity from damages and immunity from injunctive relief." Id.
55. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
56. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 18-19. The general rule is that a suit by
private parties "seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in
the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (finding that the award of retroactive benefits was barred by th 2 0
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One of the plainest examples of this paradigm is evident in Miliken
v. Bradley (11). 57 In Miliken, the Supreme Court upheld a school de-
segregation order requiring the expenditure of both state and local
funds to implement a decree.58 In its ruling for the plaintiff, the Court
ordered wide-sweeping remedies as part of this equitable relief
scheme. 59 The state had to pay for the Court's exhaustive remedy list,
which included remedial reading programs, counseling, training, and
testing.6" Such precedent is significant if state and local officials will
be forced to spend money to implement a transportation plan to pro-
tect its vulnerable residents.
In the proposed Section 1983 claim against local government, state
officials, and local officials with relation to the Katrina victims, the
successful plaintiff would need to obtain a declaratory judgment that a
constitutional violation had occurred, and then obtain a structural af-
firmative injunction to prevent future violations. The injunctive relief
could then be funded from the government treasury to realize the im-
plementation of the evacuation plan. In plain terms: put some buses
in place to move people to safety.
III. A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
The Fourteenth Amendment has long been a favorite of the Section
1983 claimant.61 Most useful has been the Due Process Clause, which
Eleventh Amendment). However, the Supreme Court has permitted the expenditure
of state and local funds to implement provisions under the prospective-compliance
exception. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 18.
57. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id. at 284-88.
60. Id. at 289. The Court sought to clarify the muddy waters of prospective/com-
pensatory expenditures by focusing on the prospective benefits that would ensue from
the implementation of the educational components. Id. at 290. It addressed the Elev-
enth Amendment objections in the following manner:
The [Edelman] exception, which had its genesis in Ex parte Young, permits
federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to require-
ments of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the
state treasury .... That the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does
not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to
bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore
hold that such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Miliken, 433 U.S. at 290.
61. As one commentator recognizes, the right to "liberty" is the protected right
most frequently the subject of section 1983 litigation. Roberta M. Saielli, Casenote,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services: The Future of Section
1983 Actions for State Inaction, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 169, 170 (1989). "The Court's
treatment of cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of-
fers the best illustration of remedial concerns that seem to have affected the delinea-
tion of substantive rights." JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 217. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that section 1983 is not a source of substantive
rights; rather, the Court characterizes section 1983 as a means to vindicate federal
rights elsewhere conferred. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). "It
should also be evident that the overriding theme of Section 1983 is the centrality of
421
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has opened the door for claims arising under various deprivations of
"life, liberty or property" interests.62 The Fourteenth Amendment,
enacted in 1868, reads in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
63
The Fourteenth Amendment has generally been read to confer only
negative rights; that is, it is seen as a restraint for government interfer-
ence with certain constitutional guarantees. 64 Generally, the Four-
teenth Amendment does not create positive rights, or imposes
affirmative obligations on the government to protect those same con-
stitutional guarantees.
65
The typical Section 1983 claim based on a Fourteenth Amendment
violation involves a government actor (state or local) who actively de-
prives a plaintiff of a protected liberty interest.66 Efforts to expand
the Due Process Clause to include affirmative obligations to act have
been almost foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court in
DeShaney.67 Nevertheless, the Court did carve out two narrow excep-
tions to the general no-duty rule: the state-created danger exception
and the special relationship exception.68 Both exceptions may be used
to create liability for local government, state officials, and local offi-
cials who failed to evacuate the poor, sick, and elderly during the
threat of Hurricane Katrina. First, however, it is important to under-
stand the background of the no-duty rule exceptions through the
widely-discussed DeShaney case.
the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement." Ross, supra note 49, at 13. None-
theless, the Section 1983 claim is not limited to the vindication of 14th Amendment
rights. Id. at 41. A Section 1983 suit may be brought to enforce the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, among others.
Id.
62. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 217.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. The Constitution does not require affirmative acts by the government to assist
individuals. Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional
Tort, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 1 (1982). It ordinarily places only negative restric-
tions on government. Id. The case law also reflects a "deeply entrenched" belief that
the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties, or rights that restrain the govern-
ment. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 552.
65. The Due Process Clause has been interpreted to confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even to secure life, liberty or property interest the government
itself may not deprive the individual. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 847.
66. See e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (asserting a
section 1983 claim against a county for its hiring of a police officer who plaintiff
claimed used excessive force and violated her Constitutional rights in making an
arrest).
67. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989).
68. See id. at 196-202. Al
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A. DeShaney v. Department of Winnebago Service
The facts of DeShaney never fail to illicit sympathy and outrage,
and for good reason.69 The case involves a young boy who was sus-
pected of being a victim of child abuse at the hands of his father.7 °
Following a divorce in which the father was granted custody of the
child, 7 1 little Joshua DeShaney was seen and treated for multiple inju-
ries. 72 The father remarried and soon divorced his second wife, who
told police that her ex-husband "was a prime case for child abuse.
73
Later, the father's new live-in girlfriend took Joshua to the hospital to
be treated for bruises and abrasions. 4 Hospital officials reported that
Joshua might be subject to child abuse.75 Joshua was temporarily
placed in the hospital's custody, but in short time returned to his fa-
ther.76 The suspicions of abuse continued to mount; reports of sus-
pected abuse poured in to the caseworker for the Department of
Social Services who was assigned to Joshua's case.77  In fact, a
caseworker visited the DeShaney home approximately thirteen times
during a twelve month period,78 yet no one instituted any proceedings
to remove Joshua from the home. In March 1984, the father beat
69. The DeShaney opinion has been the subject of much academic discussion,
much of it oppositional. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Essay, Administrative Failure
and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078 (1990); Steven
J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991); Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Chil-
dren and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659 (1990).
70. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
71. Id. at 191. After being granted custody by a Wyoming court, the father shortly
took his son to Neenah, a city located in Winnebago, Wisconsin. Id.
72. Id. at 192-93.
73. Id. at 191-92. The second wife complained that the father had previously "hit
the boy causing marks and [was] a prime case for child abuse." Id. at 192. Social
Services interviewed the father, who denied the accusations, and social services did
not pursue the matter further. Id.
74. Saielli, supra note 61, at 177.
75. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
76. Id. Joshua spent three days in temporary state custody before he was returned
to his father. Id. The return was primarily based on lack of sufficient evidence of
child abuse and the father's promise to adhere to a voluntary agreement to protect
Joshua. Id. The agreement included enrollment in a preschool program and counsel-
ing. Id.
77. Id. at 192-93.
78. Saielli, supra note 61, at 178. On two of the caseworker's visits to the
DeShaney home, she was told Joshua was too ill to see her. See Jason L. Weisberg,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services: The Special Relation-
ship Doctrine Reconsidered, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (1990). Nevertheless, So-
cial Services did nothing. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. Al
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Joshua so severely he was left in a life-threatening coma.7 9 Doctors
said the child, only four years old at the time, would never recover.
80
In the Section 1983 claim against the department, Joshua and his
mother alleged that Winnebago County, the county Department of
Social Services, the caseworker, and her supervisor had deprived
Joshua of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.81 Specifi-
cally, the complaint asserted that Joshua had been deprived of his pro-
tected liberty because of the respondents' failure to intervene to
protect Joshua from his father's violent actions of which they knew or
should have known. 82 Had the officials been more diligent in investi-
gating the abuse complaints, the mother argued, Joshua would not
have been crippled by his father.8 3
The United States Supreme Court rejected the mother's argument.
The bench found that while the facts of the story are heartbreaking,'
there is no constitutional violation because the circumstances only
gave rise to a failure-to-act case.81 Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist announced that the Constitution only serves as a re-
straint against government misconduct. 86  He reiterated that the
government has no affirmative duty to act to protect citizens from
79. Id. "Emergency brain surgery revealed a series of hemorrhages caused by
traumatic injuries to the head inflicted over a long period of time." Id. Joshua is
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly
retarded. Id.
80. See id. The father was eventually tried and convicted for child abuse. Id.
81. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
granted summary judgment for the respondents. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812
F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1987).
82. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193; see also Marne Brom, Case Note, 39 DRAKE L.
REV. 911, 912 (1990). "The caseworker was aware that Joshua had been hospitalized
... , and "that he was never without a bump, scratch or burn during her inspections."
Weisberg, supra note 78, at 1124.
83. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Government Duty to Protect: Post-DeShaney Devel-
opments, 19 ToURo L. REV. 679, 680 (2003).
84. For reasons to be discussed in greater detail, see infra text accompanying notes
90-92, the dissent's characterization of the case led to the "Poor Joshua" moniker
often used to refer to the case. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 35, at 236 n.b. Justice
Blackmun's begins the last paragraph of his dissent with: "Poor Joshua! Victim of
repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and
abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing .. " DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203 (majority opinion). "The Court granted certiorari
to resolve the inconsistent positions taken by lower courts as to whether the four-
teenth Amendment imposes a duty on the state to'protect individuals, not in the
state's custody, from harm [inflicted] by private individuals." Brom, supra note 82, at
913.
86. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96. Z
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wrongs committed by private parties.87 "The most that can be said of
the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did noth-
ing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for
them."88
While the dissent characterized the state conduct as an example of
state action that fell below constitutional standards,89 the majority
view held fast to its characterization of the case as a prime example of
a no-duty rule.9" Because Joshua had been injured by his own father,
a private person, there was no duty by the State to protect him; conse-
quently, there could be no liability for the State's failure to protect the
boy.9 ' The majority seemed very concerned with expanding the Due
Process Clause to impose affirmative obligations on the state.92 The
Court did, however, leave open the door for two exceptions to the no-
duty rule.
B. State-Created Danger Exception
The state-created danger exception relies on state conduct that en-
hances the risk faced by the plaintiff.93 This exception is grounded in
the premise that a state actor who, by its actions, places citizens in a
more vulnerable position may face Section 1983 liability.94 This ex-
87. Id. at 195, 197. He explained that the Due Process Clause is intended to "pro-
tect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each
other." Id. at 196. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Framers planned to commit
government obligation with regard to protection from others to the democratic politi-
cal process. Id.
88. Id. at 203.
89. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). "This is more than a quibble over dicta; it is a
point about perspective, having substantive ramifications. In a constitutional setting
that distinguishes sharply between action and inaction, one's characterization of the
misconduct alleged under §1983 may effectively decide the case." Id. at 204. Further,
Justice Brennan would find that the State's knowledge of the child's predicament and
expressions of intent to provide help would rise to a "'limitation of his freedom to act
on his own behalf' or to obtain help from others." Weisberg, supra note 78, at 1128.
90. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (majority opinion). ". . .the State had no constitu-
tional duty to protect Joshua against his father's violence; its failure to do so - though
calamitous in hindsight - simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause." Id.
91. Id. at 201. "As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 197.
92. Id. at 195; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 683 ("...DeShaney is the
touchstone for all subsequent discussions about the affirmative duty to provide pro-
tection under due process. The Court held that the government generally has not
duty to protect people from privately inflicted harms.").
93. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-202.
94. Id. at 201. The majority pointed out that when the state took custody of
Joshua temporarily and then returned him to his father, it "placed him in no worse
position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all; the State does
not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once offered
him shelter." Id. Some lower courts have worked hard to expand the state-created
danger exception, and with some success for plaintiffs. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ ET
425
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ception also has been characterized as the "snake pit" model.95 Some
Section 1983 plaintiffs have relied on the state-crated danger scenario
to effectively expand the Due Process Clause.96
Wood v. Ostrander, from the Ninth Circuit, is a compelling example
in which the state-created danger exception was employed to support
a Section 1983 claim. 97 In Wood, a Washington State Trooper pulled
over a car at 2:30 in the morning because the driver had the high
beams on.9 8 Because the driver of the vehicle was intoxicated, the
trooper arrested him, called a tow truck for his car to be impounded,
and took the keys to the car. 99 The passenger of the vehicle, a woman,
asked the trooper how she would get home.100 The officer apologized
and insisted that the woman exit the vehicle;1"' she was left to walk
home by herself in fifty-degree weather. 10 2 As the woman started her
five mile journey home on foot, she passed up offers from strangers in
passing cars. 10 3 Eventually, the woman accepted a ride from a stran-
ger, who took her to a secluded area and raped her. 104 She filed a
Section 1983 claim against the officer based on a violation of her due
process rights.1'0 The District Court granted summary judgment dis-
missal as to the trooper, and the Ninth Circuit reversed."0 6
AL., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, 3D ED. VOL. 1A, 158-60; see
also Nicholas Seidule, A Fly in the Soup Bowl: Using the State-Created Danger Doc-
trine to Find Liability Against the State of Louisiana for the Katrina Disaster, 5-10
(unpublished manuscript, on file with NOVA LAW REVIEW).
95. Accurately characterized as dicta, the snake pit/state created danger exception
"could be read as implying that the state action that enhances the risk of private harm
may violate the due process clause." SCHWARTZ, supra note 94, at 158. The snake pit
name is taken from Judge Posner's opinion in Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618
(7th Cir. 1982) ("If the state puts a man in a position of danger... and then fails to
protect him ... it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake
pit."). One example of the snake pit model involves a plaintiff who is attacked after
police abandons her in a high-crime area. Julie Shapiro, Snake Pits and Unseen Ac-
tors: Constitutional Liability for Indirect Harm, 62 U. CIN. L. REV 883, 923 (1994).
96. The theory has been used with measured victory in the Ninth Circuit, Third
Circuit and Tenth Circuit. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90, 596 (9th Cir.
1989); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201, 1211 (3d Cir. 1996); Armijo v. Wagon
Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262-64 (10th Cir. 1998).
97. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 583-90.
98. Id. at 586.
99. Id.
100. Id. "Ostrander [the trooper] left Wood near a military reservation in the Park-
land area of Pierce County, which has the highest aggravated crime rate in the county
outside the City of Tacoma." Id.
101. Id. The trooper admits to telling the woman that he was sorry, but she would
have to get out of the car. Id. The two dispute whether the trooper offered to call for
a ride. Id.
102. Id. At the time, the woman was wearing only jeans and a blouse. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 587.
106. Id. at 586. A
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In allowing the case to proceed, the Ninth Circuit relied implicitly
on the state-created danger exception. 0 7 The court analyzed the via-
bility of the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim by focusing on whether the
trooper's conduct deprived the woman of a federal constitutional or
statutory right. 1°8 Kneipp v. Tedder'0 9 articulates a helpful test to de-
termine whether the state-created danger exception applies.1 ° Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit, a state-created danger case requires: (1)
foreseeable harm faced by the plaintiff, (2) willful disregard of that
harm by the state actor, (3) a relationship between the state actor and
the plaintiff, and (4) conduct by the defendant that enhances a risk or
creates one that otherwise would not have existed but for the defen-
dant's conduct.111
In applying the state-created danger theory to the proposed Section
1983 Katrina claim, an argument may be made that the state and local
officials left the residents of New Orleans in a virtual "snake-pit" and
effectively met the four criteria that outline the exception. First, the
threat of an imminent, powerful hurricane was a foreseeable harm
that would be faced by the plaintiff." 2 As early as 5 a.m. August 27,
2006, the threat of Hurricane Katrina loomed over the New Orleans
region." 3 Unlike other natural disasters such as tornados or earth-
quakes, hurricanes arrive with a fair amount of warning. In addition,
the National Hurricane Center had issued warnings that Katrina
might make landfall as a Category 5 storm, and was barreling toward
New Orleans." 4 Moreover, before making its way toward Louisiana,
Katrina had already visited Florida, where it dumped 18 inches of rain
107. See id. at 589. The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff had "raised a triable issue
of fact as to whether [trooper's] conduct 'affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a posi-
tion of danger."' Id. at 589-90.
108. Id. at 587. The court acknowledged that the state played a role in creating the
danger faced by the plaintiff. Id. at 590. However, the recognition of the "snake-pit"
exception does not guarantee judgment for the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff sur-
vived a motion to dismiss, "[o]n remand [the trooper] was tried before a jury, and a
verdict for defendants was returned." Shapiro, supra note 95, at 929, n.172.
109. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996). Kneipp, which also involved a
police stop, involved a Section 1983 claim brought on behalf of a woman who was
injured after police sent her home on foot. Id. at 1202-03. The woman, who was
visibly intoxicated at the time police sent her off, was injured in a fall down an em-
bankment and suffered severe brain damage. Id. at 1203.
110. See id. at 1208.
111. Id.; see also Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1995).
112. One factor that the court considered in Wood, for instance, was the fact that
the area where the defendant trooper left the plaintiff was a known high crime area.
879 F.2d at 590. The court noted that the state trooper had been in the area for years
and that he may be chargeable with knowledge of the crime rate in the area. Id.
"Moreover, the inherent danger facing a woman left alone at night in an unsafe area
is a matter of common sense." Id.
113. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 1-3.
114. Id. at 1.
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and left half-a-million people without power.' 15 Because the state and
local government officials had ample time to prepare for and appreci-
ate the severity of the threat presented by Katrina, the hurricane
could accurately be described as a foreseeable harm.
The next factor to be explored in the state-created danger exception
is the defendant's willful disregard of the foreseeable risk faced by the
plaintiff.1 16 State and local officials who did not evacuate the poor,
sick, and elderly may also satisfy this element. The poverty and cor-
relative immobility that impairs the residents of New Orleans is no
secret, and certainly should not have been news to the elected offi-
cials.117 Knowing about such a scarcity of resources, the state's failure
to evacuate people in the storm's worst path could be seen as willful
disregard for their safety.'
18
A relationship between the state actor and the plaintiff must also be
found to support a claim for a due process violation based on the
state-created danger exception.1 19 Courts generally have required a
relationship that sets the plaintiff apart from the general public.1 2 ° In
Wood, for example, the state trooper knew of the special threat facing
the plaintiff, which was enough to find that a relationship between the
two existed. 12 1 In the Katrina case, the relationship factor may be sat-
isfied by virtue of the evacuee status of the victims. On Sunday, Au-
gust 28, 2006, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory
evacuation. 22 It was the first time a mandatory order had been issued
for the residents in the region.' 23 It may also be enough to create a
special status of the residents and satisfy the relationship prong of the
state-created danger test.
The last element of the exception is the defendant's conduct.
Courts willing to utilize the state-created danger exception demand
115. Id. at 3. "Driving winds had torn door off houses, bent trailers like horseshoes,
sent sloops surfing onto front lawns, and chewed up industrial parks, coughing out
plywood and shards." Id. There were seven reported storm-related deaths. Id. The
number eventually grew to 14 deaths in Florida as being directly, indirectly or possi-
bly related to Hurricane Katrina. Ctr. For Disease Control, Mortality Associated with
Hurricane Katrina - Florida and Alabama, MMWR WEEKLY, Mar. 10, 2006, at 239,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5509a5.htm.
116. Awareness of the risk alone is not enough to impose an affirmative duty to act
and support a claim. Ross, supra note 49, at 190.
117. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
118. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell shared his disappointments on the gov-
ernment's response to Hurricane Katrina and voiced his frustration with the lack of
resources available for Katrina victims in a televised interview not long after the
storm. Colin Powell on Iraq, Race, and Hurricane Relief, ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2005)
http//abcnews.go.com/2020/Politics/story?id=1105979&page=1 (interview by Barbara
Walters with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State on "20/20").
119. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996); Seidule, supra note
94, at 8.
120. Id.
121. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir, 1989).
122. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 111.
123. Russell, supra note 19.
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that the defendant's conduct create a risk that otherwise would not
have existed for the plaintiff, or one that enhances the risk faced by
the plaintiff. 24 With regard to the Katrina victims, the court must
only examine the government's response to the victims once the
threat of the hurricane bore down. One argument is that the govern-
ment's conduct created a risk that would not have otherwise existed
because evacuees relied on the government to help get them to
safety.125 Evacuation is a critical component of hurricane prepared-
ness, and detailed evacuation, planning, and implementation is a re-
sponsibility of potentially affected areas.126 Indeed, New Orleans city
officials were responsible for executing an evacuation plan and were
vested with the authority to commandeer resources to assist in the
evacuation. 127 Nevertheless, more than 50,000 people were not evacu-
ated before the storm hit.128 Furthermore, the decision to issue the
mandatory evacuation order only 15 hours before the storm was
scheduled to hit exacerbated an already dangerous situation. 129 Re-
sidents waited on the mandatory evacuation before seeking refuge,13 °
and justifiably so. It is unreasonable for local officials to attempt to
124. "To the Wood majority, the realities of the time and place where the plaintiff
was stranded enhanced the risk that she would be harmed." SHWARTZ, supra note 94,
at 160.
125. Evacuation failures led to "catastrophic circumstances" when Katrina made
landfall in New Orleans. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 103. After the
levy failures, floodwaters ran through low-lying areas and thousands of people were
trapped. Id. at 103-104. See also ANDERSON COOPER, DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE
124-30 (2006).
126. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 103.
127. Id.
[T]he New Orleans Plan provides that "[t]ransportation will be provided to
those persons requiring public transportation from the area," placing the Re-
gional Transit Authority as the lead agency for transportation, supported by
multiple federal, state, and local agencies, including the Orleans Parish
School Board, New Orleans Equipment Maintenance Division, Louisiana
Department of Transportation, Louisiana National Guard, Port of New Or-
leans, U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, and Amtrack.
The tasks allotted to the RTA include: "plac[ing] special vehicles on alert to
be utilized if needed[,] [p]osition[ing] supervisors and dispatch[ing] evacua-
tion buses [and i]f warranted by scope of evacuation, implement[ing] addi-
tional service."
Id. at 113.
128. Cf id. at 115. Despite their authority to requisition resources to implement the
evacuation plan, New Orleans city officials failed to utilize the resources needed to
move 70,000 people out of storm's path. Id. at 103. "Those who did not evacuate
included many who did not have their own means of transportation."
129. See supra note 17.
130. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 5. Some residents, even after receiving the
mandatory evacuation, did not heed the warnings and attempt to relocate to safer
ground. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 114. These stubborn residents
do not excuse the acts of the local officials with regard to those who were ready,
willing but unable to evacuate as the storm closed in. It is estimated that between 10
and 25 percent of residents play "hurricane roulette" and will not heed a mandatory
evacuation order. Id.
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escape liability by pointing to general hurricane warnings; because re-
sidents know that an imminent threat should trigger a mandatory
evacuation, they reasonably relied on the local officials in this regard.
Furthermore, local officials made a bad situation worse by failing to
take basic steps needed to assist their special-needs residents.' 3 1 Spe-
cifically, "hundreds of city buses and school buses that could have
been used for evacuation sat useless . "..."132 The failure to issue a
timely evacuation order, coupled with the failure to help residents
without transportation get to higher ground, satisfies the last element
of the state-created danger test; these stark acts by officials are no
different than casting an evacuee in a proverbial "snake-pit."' 33
C. Special Relationship Exception
In addition to the state-created danger exception to the no-duty
rule advanced in DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court also
recognized a narrow exception known as the special relationship ex-
ception.134 Under the special relationship exception, an affirmative
duty to act may be triggered by a special relationship between the
state actor and the plaintiff.'35 The special relationship has typically
been held to apply in instances involving prisoners,136 mental patients
who have been involuntarily institutionalized,'137 and those who have
been involuntarily placed at foster homes.138 An analysis of lower
courts wrestling to apply this exception has generally revealed the fol-
lowing traits: the state's assumption of control over the plaintiff's envi-
131. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 64-65 (addressing the reluctance of New Orleans
nursing homes to leave absent a mandatory evacuation order from the mayor or gov-
ernor). In addition, the failure of the levee system could also be properly character-
ized as a dangerous example of state and local enhancement of risk. The levees were
an "incomplete patchwork of protection riddled by design flaws and poor mainte-
nance. The hurricane protection system in New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana was
a system in name only." John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at Al.
132. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 119.
133. Testimonials support the theory that a more timely evacuation would have
saved lives. For instance, "[t]he President of the Louisiana Nursing Home Associa-
tion told Select Committee staff that at least one nursing home had been unable to
evacuate its patents prelandfall because it could not find bus drivers by the time the
mandatory evacuation order was issued." Id. at 115.
134. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
198-201 (1989). The special relationship exception has also been referred to as the
custodial relationship exception.
135. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 94, at 161.
136. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
137. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
138. See Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1993). In fact, the majority in
DeShaney said that if Joshua DeShaney had been in foster home, the analysis would
have differed significantly. 489 U.S. at 202 n.9. "Had the State by affirmative exercise
of its power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home oper-
ated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or
institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect." Id. 430
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ronment-which results in the plaintiff's lack of choice in assistance-
and the state's failure to provide a meaningful alternative. 139 A classic
example is the welfare of a prisoner being held in police custody who
is suffering from a medical condition. 4 ° Although the state has no
general duty to provide medical care for its citizens, it does have an
affirmative duty to provide medical care for the prisoners in its
care. 4 ' There are two guiding factors for such a duty: first, the state
has assumed control of the prisoner's environment and welfare by vir-
tue of the incarceration, and second, the prisoner has been deprived of
private sources of aid through his or her confinement.' 42
The 1992 case of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee'4 3 serves as
an unsettling example of the special relationship exception. In
Sinthasomphone, police responded to a 911 emergency call to help a
person in need of assistance. 44 When the police arrived shortly
before 2 a.m. on May 27, 1991, they found Konerak Sinthasomphone,
a Laoatian 14-year-old boy, wandering the streets naked and bleed-
ing. 45 The two black women who had called police were present and
trying to steer the young man to safety.14 6 "However, the police of-
ficers ordered the women to leave the young man alone.' 47 When a
white man from a nearby apartment appeared and claimed that the
boy was with him, 1 48 the black women vigorously objected. 149 Never-
theless, the police delivered the boy to the man, who killed him almost
as soon as the police left the scene.'5 ° The man was serial killer Jef-
139. Ross, supra note 49, at 170.
140. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (holding that prison officials who failed to pro-
vide adequate medical care for an inmate violated the Constitutional ban on cruel and
unusual punishment).
141. See id.
142. See Saielli, supra note 61, at 174. In prison settings, "the government's breach
of an affirmative duty constitutes a constitutional deprivation under section 1983."
Id.
143. Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Wis.
1992).
144. Id. at 1345.
145. Id. at 1345-46.
146. Id. at 1346.
147. Id.
148. Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 838 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (E.D.
Wis. 1993). The man had met Konerak at the mall, and taken him home with a prom-
ise to pay him to pose for pictures. Id. at 1322. After getting Konerak to his apart-
ment, the man offered him a drink laced with Halcion, and when Konerak fell asleep,
he drilled a small hole into the child's head. Id. The man then poured diluted hydro-
chloric acid into the hole so Konerak would be in a "zombie-like" state. Id.
149. See Sinthasomphone, 785 F. Supp. at 1346-47. The complaint also alleged that
the women told police that the child had been drugged and that the white man claim-
ing custody of Konerak had referred to him by different name. Id. at 1345-46. The
police officers threatened them with arrest if they continued to intervene or provide
information. Id. at 1346.
150. Id. at 1345-46. The police concluded that Konerak and Dahmer were adult
homosexual partners who, at the time, were staying together. Id. at 1346-47.
2007]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
frey Dahmer, who eventually confessed to killing 17 young men be-
tween the ages of 14 and 28.151
In its Section 1983 claim against the responding police officers and
the City of Milwaukee Police Department, the parents of the slain boy
argued that their Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by
the officers' failure to protect their son from danger.1 52 More signifi-
cantly, the Sinthasomphone plaintiffs argued that the officers pre-
vented private citizens from helping their child and delivered him into
Dahmer's custody.153 The city moved to dismiss the complaint based
on the argument that the death resulted from the wrongs of a third
party, and there could be no city liability for a failure to protect from
the acts of an intervening actor.1 54 The Eastern District of Wisconsin
rejected the city's argument. 55 The court reasoned that the facts of
the case were best characterized-not as a failure to act-but one in
which the police officers took affirmative steps to create the danger.'
56
Also, the court found that even under a failure to act characterization,
it could not "at the motion to dismiss stage ... say that no special
relationship existed between Konerak and the three police of-
ficers." '57 Where the state assumed control of the child's environment
and cut off private sources of aid without providing a meaningful al-
ternative, the plaintiff stated a cause of action under Section 1983 and
the Due Process Clause. 58
This same analysis applied to the circumstances in Ross v. United
States.
159 In Ross, a police officer arrived on the scene at the time a
151. Id. at 1345. At the time, Dahmer was on probation for a 1988 conviction for
sexual abuse of a male child. Id. at 1346. Dahmer pled guilty to 15 of his 16 Milwau-
kee homicides, which were committed between January 1988 and July 1991. Id. at
1345. In February 1992, Dahmer was sentenced in Wisconsin to life in prison. The
Dahmer Timeline, USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 1994, at 3A. In November 1994, Dahmer
was attacked in prison and killed. Id.
152. See Sinthasomphone, 785 F. Supp. at 1347.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1346. The city moved to dismiss the cases under 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Id. The plaintiff also raised the
custom and policy argument, which was found by the court to state a claim. Id. at
1350-51. The court found that a "de facto custom or policy exists, giving rise to sec-
tion 1983 liability." Id. at 1351.
155. See id. at 1350-51. The parents of the subsequent victims killed by Dahmer
also attempted to bring suit but were summarily rejected. Id. at 1351. The court
deemed the subsequent deaths "too remote" under law to establish a claim. Id.
156. Id. at 1349. "In other words, the allegations are not just of police inaction, but
of police action, action which violated Konerak Sinthasomphone's substantive due
process rights." Id.
157. Id. at 1350.
158. See Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 838 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D.
Wis. 1993). Though successful in surviving a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's due
process claim could not survive a motion for summary judgment. See id. The court
found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim
against them and allowed the equal protection claims against them to remain. Id. at
1328.
159. Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990). Al
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12-year-old boy was drowning and refused to allow other would-be
rescuers to intervene on the boy's behalf.16 ° The child had walked out
onto a breakwater, slipped, and fell into the waters of Lake Michi-
gan.16 ' A friend quickly summoned help, and within ten minutes,
seven people arrived to come to help the child.' 6 2 Incredibly, the of-
ficer was enforcing an intergovernmental agreement and elected to
wait for the arrival of the county rescuers to save the boy; the officer
also prevented anyone else present from assisting the drowning
child.1 63 He even threatened the others on the scene with arrest if
they attempted to help.'6 4 After another twenty minutes of struggling
in the water, the preferred workers rescued the boy, but he eventually
died as a result of his injuries.'65 The Seventh Circuit found that alle-
gation stated a Section 1983 cause of action against the county
defendants.
166
The special-relationship exception to the no-duty rule, which re-
quires both the state's assumption of control of the environment and
its failure to provide a meaningful alternative, can be applied to the
local and state government response to Katrina victims in support of a
Section 1983 claim for a due process violation. First and foremost, it is
paramount that the plaintiffs trace the narrative of Katrina to empha-
size conditions of the plaintiffs, rather than the circumstances that led
160. Id. at 1424-25.
161. Id. at 1424.
162. Id. A nearby festival was occurring, and several emergency response person-
nel were nearby. Id. Among the group of people who had come to offer assistance
within ten minutes: two lifeguards, two firefighters, one police officer, and two civil-
ian scuba divers with a boat and equipment. Id.
163. Id. at 1424-25.
The city of Waukegan and Lake County had previously entered into an in-
tergovernmental agreement that required the county to provide all police
services in the entities' concurrent jurisdiction on Lake Michigan. Under its
authority to police the lake, the county and its sheriff had promulgated a
policy that directed all members of the sheriff's department to prevent any
civilian from attempting to rescue a person in danger of drowning in the
lake. This policy contemplated that only divers from the city of Waukegan
Fire Department could carry out such a rescue.
Id.
164. Id. at 1425.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1434. The plaintiff also attempted to make a claim under the Federal
Torts Claims Acts against the city for its role in the agreement and the United States
based on the United States' status as owner of the breakwater. Id. at 1426. The court
ruled that the harm was not foreseeable and dismissed the United States from the
suit. Id. at 1434. After winding its way through the court system (five different courts
in eight years), the case against the city was dismissed and the county was urged to
"exhaustively explore" the county's "duty, if any, to provide the police and safety
services at issue" before the court would entertain any more motions to dismiss. See
Ross v. County of Lake, 764 F. Supp. 1308, 1309-11 (N.D. I11. 1991); Ross v. City of
Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1993). A
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them there.167 Namely, the state and local officials shared a special
relationship with the evacuees by virtue of the evacuees' status. The
state assumed control of the environment and responsibility by issuing
a contraflow order and deeming the area a mandatory evacuation
zone. At 4 p.m. Saturday, August 27, 2006, a little more than 38 hours
before the storm made landfall, the governor issued a contraflow traf-
fic order that impacted almost 80 percent of the region.' 68 The con-
traflow order redirected traffic on affected roads to move only out of
the city.
169
While the contraflow order has been credited with saving lives, °70 it
still must be evaluated through the massive restriction it placed on
potential outside sources of aid.17' The analysis of the contraflow or-
der becomes even more troubling when considered with the state's
shamefully inadequate fulfillment of its evacuation obligations. Sig-
nificantly, the issuance of a mandatory evacuation order triggered a
duty by the state to adhere to its own guidelines, which called for com-
mandeering resources to help those in need. Still, thousands were left
behind.1 72 The failure of the officials to provide transportation out of
the storm's path all but guaranteed that no meaningful alternative
would be available to those in Katrina's path.173 Moreover, the
crowds that ended up in the shelter were also facing hardship.
167. See generally Shapiro, supra note 95. "A broader reading of the special rela-
tionship doctrine would offer greater protection of an individual's right to be free
from the arbitrary government conduct that due process claims were meant to guard
against." Weisberg, supra note 78, at 1130.
168. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 54, 108. The Louisiana State Police turned over all
lanes to outward traffic on four New Orleans interstate highways. Id. Two toll roads,
the Crescent City connection and the Lake Ponchartrain Causeway were all free. Id.
The contraflow run through Sunday, August 28, 2006, at 6 p.m. Id. at 64. The con-
traflow efforts were coordinated with the states of Mississippi and Texas. Id.
169. Id.; see also Mary Swerczek, Police meet to iron out evacuation glitches; Con-
traflow Basically Worked Well, Chief Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 10,
2006, at 1B (noting that the contraflow plan worked well, but that residents could
benefit from education about the routes and an automated call system).
170. "Up to 1.2 million Louisiana residents followed the evacuation orders [and
used the contraflow pattern to leave] in their private vehicles." A FAILURE OF INITIA-
TIVE, supra note 1, at 64.
171. Despite the contraflow plan, it soon became apparent that thousands in New
Orleans did not (or could not) leave. Even those who heeded the call had some
trouble. "A last minute evacuation of America's thirty-fifth largest city was fraught
with problems, with or without the relief of contraflow. Those on the highways were
the modern day equivalent of the Joads, the Dust Bowlers who escaped Oklahoma in
an old touring car during the Great Depression." BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 101. In
addition, anyone with relatives or friends in neighboring states would be hard-pressed
during the contraflow efforts to drive in to the city to offer aid.
172. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 103. Of the 70,000 individuals
who did not leave, many did not have their own means of transportation. Id. "De-
spite the declaration of a mandatory evacuation on Sunday before landfall, New Orle-
ans officials still did not completely evacuate the population. Instead, they opened
the Superdome as a 'shelter of last resort' for those individuals." Id.
173. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. Fortunately, not everyone left
behind perished in the storm. "The U.S. Coast Guard alone reported that it rescul43t
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The shelters in New Orleans were "woefully inadequate."' 174 Basic
emergency planners prefer evacuation over sheltering because those
sheltered must face the most intense dangers of the storm. 7 5 The so-
called "shelter of last resort"-the Superdome-was ill-equipped to
deal with the masses who sought refuge there. 7 6 Even if the state had
no obligation to provide transportation or shelter to evacuees, once it
assumed the duties, it did have a duty to act within Constitutional
guidelines.177 Essentially, controlling the flow of traffic into the city
without providing a way out cuts off private sources of aid without
providing a meaningful alternative-the sine qua non of a special rela-
tionship exception.'78
IV. CONCLUSION
What has been learned from Katrina? For now, it seems, not much.
One year after the storm ravaged the Gulf Coast, reports indicate that
the government is still unable to meet the needs of its citizens.17 9 In
more than 33,000 [people]." A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 116. There
were also rescues completed by the Louisiana National Guard, local police, the De-
partment of Wildlife and Fisheries, Federal rescue personnel and several law enforce-
ment and private volunteers. Id.
174. See id. at 113.
175. Id.
176. Shortly after Katrina hit, the Superdome devolved into the "epicenter of
human misery." BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 192. There was a hole in the roof, the
building lost power, the artificial turf was soaked, toilets backed up and grown men
were defacating in front of little children. Id. But see A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE,
supra note 1, at 117 (stating that while the situation was bad, "there was never a
shortage of food and water"). The Convention Center, which was never designated a
shelter, was sanctioned by the city and was worse. Id. at 118. The Convention Center
had no power, no functioning toilets, no food and no water. Id. New Orleans Mayor
Ray Nagin announced at the start of the 2006 hurricane season that "based on the
bitter experiences of Katrina, the city had no plans to open a massive shelter in a
hurricane." James Varney, Nagin to Set Forth Storm Plan, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), May 2, 2006, at lA.
177. "The Court has held that once a state undertakes to provide a service, it must
perform that service in accordance with constitutional principles." Sarah C. Kellogg,
The Due Process Right to a Safe and Humane Environment for Patients in State Cus-
tody: The Voluntary/Involuntary Distinction, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 339, 355-56 (1997).
178. Admittedly, courts have been very reluctant to expand the special relationship
exception beyond those involuntarily held. See, e.g., Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538, 540
(11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the state had no constitutional duty of protection to a
voluntary summer school student killed after leaving a school session). However, the
traits of involuntary classification-loss of control over one's choices and few options
to provide for one's welfare-should, by analogy, lend support to the special relation-
ship characterization of the relationship that exists between hurricane evacuees and
the state and local officials over their charge.
179. See Christopher Lee & Anushka Asthana, As Katrina Suffering Persists, Many
Doubt Government Can Handle Next Big Storm, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 22,
2006, at Al; Leslie Williams, Red Cross: N.O.'s Shelters Unsafe, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), June 13, 2006, at lB. While the new plan calls for Amtrak trains and
about 100 buses to be available to move "special needs" residents out of harms way
and will make 65,000 shelter beds available for those who can't make other arrange-
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fact, some government officials seem even more determined to push
the responsibility for preparedness on the shoulders of its citizens, 80
despite the obvious lack of resources available.'81 And the systemic
failures that plagued the region are not unique to New Orleans or
hurricane preparedness.
182
It is therefore critical to maintain a dialogue about government re-
sponsibility' 83 and the recognition of affirmative duties in the Consti-
tution.1 84 It is even more important to pursue creative measures to
compel government to realize the expansive difference between decid-
ing and doing.85 Civil Rights case law developed through lower
courts in the post-DeShaney world still offers some means to meet the
challenges through an expanded reading of the Due Process Clause.
First, an argument may be made that the local failures concerning the
late-issued mandatory-evacuation order, in light of the obvious immo-
bility of the predominantly poor residents in the storm's worst path,
supports a state-created danger model for liability. Next, there is the
argument that the evacuee status, contraflow orders, and appallingly
deficient "shelters" give rise to a special-relationship exception. Hat-
tie Johns, a 74-year-old Katrina evacuee, expressed the frustration
many of her neighbors shared: "I know they are saying 'get out of
town,' but I don't have any way to get out. If you don't have no
money, you can't go."' 86
ments, protocol for evacuee trailer parks such as Renaissance Village is still unsettled.
Jan Moller & Gwen Filosa, Hurricane Evacuation Drill Highlights Plans, Problems;
Communications Snag Cancels Part of Exercise, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
May 24, 2006, at lB.
180. Leave Early if Storm on Way, Officials Urge, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
July 23, 2006, at 28; Graham Brink, You're on Your Own. Ready?, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES ONLINE, June 1, 2006, http://www.sptimes.com/2006/06/01/news-pf/State?You-
re-onyour-ownReshtml (quoting a county emergency management director in
Florida as saying "We're telling them the first 72 [hours] are on you. The laggards
needs to wake up and be ready to take care of themselves.").
181. See, e.g., Bill Hirschman, S. Florida Poverty Level Rises 50,000, Census Says, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug.31, 2006, at 1B (citing the increase in poverty throughout
the state of Florida).
182. Sadly, system failures with infrastructure are becoming pervasive around the
country. Infrastructure elements including transportation, dams, retaining walls, haz-
ardous waste handling and treatment facilities throughout the nation are plagued with
problems and have not been properly maintained for decades. See Young, supra note
11, at 43. Each of these deficiencies poses a serious threat to public safety. Id.
183. Pointing out that "Americans have a very, very short attention span," Ameri-
can filmmaker Spike Lee recently turned his lens to the Katrina catastrophe. See
WHEN THE LEVEES BROKE: A REQUIEM IN FOUR ACTS, (HBO televised broadcast
Aug. 29, 2006). The four-hour documentary chronicles the government failures in
response to the storm. "I think when we look back on this many years from now, I'm
confident that people are gonna see what happened in New Orleans as a defining
moment in American history."
184. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due
Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982 (1996).
185. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
186. CNN Reports: Katrina State of Emergency 16 (2005). 436
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Whether the story is cast with an emphasis on the steps taken or the
steps missed by the government, the same Constitutional values are
assaulted and destroyed. Indeed, to the Katrina victims, it is a distinc-
tion without merit. It certainly meant nothing to the 1,500-plus Ka-
trina victims who paid with their lives.' 87
The debilitating effects of poverty that paralyzed the poor, sick, and
elderly evacuees in New Orleans should have pushed the government
to follow its own procedures to ensure a safe evacuation out of the
storm's path. Instead, the government failed its citizens. "Katrina
was an act of nature," said one commentator.18 8 "But almost every-
thing that happened both before and after was an act of neglect."' 9
To ensure that such neglect-with its ensuing fatalities and immeasur-
able losses-never happens again, the state and local officials must be
held liable under the law.
Section 1983 stands for "the commitment of our society to be gov-
erned by law and to protect the rights of those without power against
oppression at the hands of the powerful." 190 Coupled with an ex-
panded reading of the Due Process Clause, Section 1983 can be used
as a powerful tool to promote government initiative.191 It is one more
weapon against the threat of disasters, natural and unnatural.' 92
187. "In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
'liberty' must be broad indeed." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
188. Gary Younge, New Orleans Forsaken, NATION, Sept. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060918/younge.
189. Id.
190. NAHMOD, supra note 35, at 50.
191. See Mark R. Brown, Accountability in Government and Section 1983, 25 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 53, 57 (1991) ("Section 1983 is perhaps the most potent civil
weapon available for securing accountability in government.").
192. "There is plenty of blame to go around. What began as a natural disaster has
become a man-made one." COOPER, supra note 125, at 160.
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